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(Post) Secular Discomforts 










If	  the	  pronouncement	  of	  a	  post-­‐secular	  age	  has	  been	  productive	  for	  scholarship	  that	  unpacks	   secular	   discomforts,	   a	   point	   of	   departure	   for	   this	   essay	   is	   to	   trace	   the	  entanglement	   of	   the	   secular	   and	   the	   religious	   in	   its	   colonial	   incarnation	   to	  contribute	   to	   extant	   scholarship	   on	   secularism	   and	   the	   post-­‐secular	   in	   the	   Indian	  context.	  I	  trace	  some	  of	  the	  contrapuntal	  debates	  on	  the	  secular	  and	  the	  post-­‐secular	  that	   have	   significance	   for	   questions	   of	   co-­‐existence	  within	   the	   Indian	  nation-­‐state.	  What	  does	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  the	  secular,	  a	  probing	  of	  its	  discomforts,	  offer	  for	  the	  question	   of	   religio-­‐secular	   co-­‐existence	   in	   the	   Indian	   context?	   And	   what	   are	   the	  limits	  of	  a	  post-­‐secular	  turn—in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  spiritual	  belief	  or	  theological	   conventions	   as	   a	   resource	   for	   co-­‐existence—if	   we	   think	   through	   the	  forms	  of	  power	  generated	  by	  this	  turn?	  How	  do	  questions	  of	  majoritarianisms	  and	  minoritisations	   inflect	   these	   debates?	   As	   I	   suggest	   in	   this	   essay,	   these	   questions	  reveal	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  discussions	  of	  the	  secular	  and	  its	  post.	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—POST-SECULAR THEORY/POSTCOLONIAL IMPLICATIONS	  	  The	   post-­‐secular	   turn	   at	   the	   intersection	   of	   the	   fields	   of	   political	   philosophy,	  anthropology	   and	   religious,	   postcolonial	   and	   cultural	   studies	   has	   highlighted	  theological	   political	   formations	   which	   have	   informed	   differential	   histories	   of	   the	  secular.	  This	  turn	  has	  witnessed	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  the	  secularisation	  thesis.1	  Yet,	  in	   order	   to	   flesh	  out	   the	   intricate	  philosophical	   relationship	  between	   the	   religious	  and	  the	  secular,	  perhaps	   the	  best	  way	  to	  begin	   this	  discussion	   is	  with	  reference	   to	  Derrida’s	   deconstruction	   of	   religion.	   In	   his	   essay,	   ‘Faith	   and	   Knowledge’,	   which	  comments	   on	   the	  Kantian	   text,	  Religion	  within	   the	   Limits	   of	   Reason	   Alone,	   Derrida	  unpacks	  the	  religious	  and	  the	  secular	  through	  tracing	  their	  etymological	  genealogy	  during	   the	   Enlightenment	   period.2	   Derrida	   argues	   that	   Kant	   arrogates	   for	  Christianity	   a	   morality	   and	   a	   reason.	   But	   the	   evangelicism	   of	   this	   reason	   also	  constitutes	   something	   that	   comes	   to	   be	   defined	   as	   the	   other	   to	   religion—a	  world	  without	   God.	   This	   other	   emerges	   in	   the	   move	   to	   validate	   practical	   reason	   above	  faith.	   As	   Derrida	   traces	   it,	   the	   conduct	   of	   morality	   also	   necessitates	   a	   ‘radical	  dissociation’	   from	   God	   or	   at	   least	   the	   need	   to	   suspend	   the	   ‘existence	   of	   God’	   in	  theory.3	  Derrida	  describes	  this	  move	  by	  asking	  ‘Is	  this	  not	  another	  way	  of	  saying	  that	  Christianity	  can	  only	  answer	  to	  its	  moral	  calling’	  to	  its	  ‘Christian	  calling	  if	  it	  endures	  in	   this	   world,	   in	   phenomenal	   history,	   the	   death	   of	   God?’4	   For	   Derrida,	   this	  Christianity	  is	  also	  ‘the	  death	  of	  God’	  that	  is	  ‘announced	  and	  recalled	  by	  Kant	  to	  the	  modernity	   of	   the	   Enlightenment’.5	   Derrida’s	   deconstructive	   move,	   therefore,	  identifies	   in	   Kant’s	   formulation	   of	   proper	   rational	   religion	   (Christianity),	   an	  emergence	  of	  the	  secular,	  through	  the	  emphasis	  on	  reason.	  But	  in	  the	  process	  of	  this	  deconstruction,	   Derrida	   traces	   how	   the	   thesis	   of	   religion,	   limited	   by	   reason,	   is	  subject	   to	   an	   aporia	   or	   a	   conundrum.	   One	   of	   the	   aporias	   present	   in	   ‘Faith	   and	  Knowledge’	  appears	   to	  be	   this:	  even	  as	  suspension	  and	  death	  of	  religion	  (implying	  the	   emergence	   of	   the	   secular)	   is	   heralded	   through	   an	   attempt	   to	   define	   a	   rational	  religion,	   the	  vocabulary	  of	  Christian	   theology	   (an	   integral	  part	  of	   the	  history	  of	   its	  link	  with	  different	  forms	  of	  political	  power)	  remains	  present	  in	  all	  that	  is	  considered	  secular	  in	  the	  present.6	  	  Perhaps	  referring	  to	  the	  opposition	  between	  globalisation	  and	  religion	  invoked	  by	  writers	  like	  Samuel	  Huntingdon	  in	  The	  Clash	  of	  Civilizations,	  Derrida	  suggests	  that	  ‘from	  here	  on,	  the	  word	  “religion”	  is	  calmly	  (and	  violently)	  applied	  to	  things	  which	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have	   always	   been	   and	   remain	   foreign	   to	  what	   this	  word	   names	   and	   arrests	   in	   its	  history’.7	   Derrida	   then	   makes	   a	   significant	   suggestion:	   ‘the	   history	   of	   the	   word	  “religion”	   should	   in	   principle	   forbid	   every	   non-­‐Christian	   from	   using	   the	   name	  “religion”,	  in	  order	  to	  recognise	  in	  it	  what	  “we”	  would	  designate,	  identify	  and	  isolate	  there’.8	   In	   making	   this	   suggestion,	   Derrida	   echoes	   Talal	   Asad	   and	   Tomoko	  Masuzawa’s	  arguments	  about	  the	  making	  of	  the	  category	  of	  religion	  as	  a	  universal.9	  Asad	   and	  Masuzawa’s	   contrapuntal	   discussion	   of	   how	   religion	   is	   made	   through	   a	  study	  of	  European	  and	  non-­‐European	  relationships	  gives	  substance	   to	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   term	   ‘religion’	   is	   a	   colonising	   discourse.	   For	   example,	   in	  Genealogies	   of	  
Religion	   Asad	   argues	   that	   a	   conception	   of	   Natural	   Religion	   paved	   the	  way	   for	   the	  universal	  category	  of	  religion.	  Tomoko	  Masuzawa	  traces	  how	  Christianity	  was	  saved	  through	   recourse	   to	   European	   taxonomies	   of	   religion.	   This	   redemption	   occurs	  through	  the	  conversion	  of	  other	  philosophical	  or	  sacred	  practices	  to	  the	  category	  of	  religion	  where,	  Masuzawa	  argues,	   the	  model	   of	   a	   rational	   Christianity	  dictates	   the	  terms	   by	   which	   other	   ‘religions’	   are	   classified.	   Derrida’s,	   Asad’s	   and	   Masuzawa’s	  studies	   suggest	   that	   European	  Christianity’s	   hegemony	  has	   been	  maintained	   since	  the	   post-­‐reformation	   era	   through	   a	   series	   of	   legitimations	   at	   different	   historical	  moments	  about	  its	  status	  as	  a	  rational	  religion;	  its	  relegitimation	  in	  the	  modern	  era	  is	   demonstrated	  with	   recourse	   to	   taxonomies	   of	   the	   other	   religions	   or	   the	   ‘world	  religions	  discourse’.	  For	  Derrida,	  a	  deconstructive	  unpacking	  of	  the	  binary	  between	  a	   rational	   secular	   and	   a	   rational	   religio	   of	   the	   Enlightenment	   that	   highlights	   how	  colonial	   sovereignty	   arrogates	   to	   itself	   a	   European	   religio-­‐secular	   reason,	   which	  emerges	   every	   time	   either	   the	   category	   of	   religion	   or	   the	   secular	   is	   invoked,	  becomes	  crucial.	  	  For	  Arvind-­‐Pal	  Mandair,	  this	  tracing	  of	  the	  religio-­‐secular	  through	  a	  history	  of	  colonialism	   has	   profound	   implications	   for	   the	   Indian	   context.	   In	   Religion	   and	   the	  
Specter	  of	  the	  West:	  Sikhism,	  India,	  Postcoloniality,	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Translation,	  an	  impressive	   study	   and	   a	   call	   for	   a	   post-­‐secular	   turn	   within	   postcolonial	   theory,	  Arvind-­‐Pal	   Mandair	   fleshes	   out	   this	   problem	   through	   a	   critique	   of	   postcolonial	  theory.10	  Contemporary	  European	  post-­‐secular	   theory,	  Mandair	   argues,	   has	   seen	  a	  ‘reversal’	   of	   its	   ‘atheistic	   roots	   in	   the	   “masters	   of	   suspicion”	   (Marx,	   Nietzche,	  Freud)’.11	   ‘As	   a	   result’,	   he	   suggests,	   ‘theory	   has	   been	   used	   to	   legitimize	   the	   use	   of	  phenomena	   from	   Judeo-­‐Christian	   traditions	   as	   resources	   not	   only	   for	   thinking	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critically	   about	   religion,	   but	   for	   thinking	  more	   critically	   about	   theory	   itself.’12	   For	  Mandair,	   these	   Judeo-­‐Christian	   resources	   have	   been	   used,	   particularly	   by	   Alain	  Badiou,	   Gianni	   Vattimo	   and	   Slavoj	   Zizek,	   to	   re-­‐energise	   critical	   theory	   and	   the	  European	   left.	   So,	   for	   example,	   Zizek’s	   ‘“engaged	   political	   interventions”	   are	  primarily	  intended	  to	  reformulate	  a	  leftist	  anticapitalist	  political	  project	  in	  an	  era	  of	  global	   capitalism	   and	   its	   ideological	   supplement,	   liberal	   democratic	  multiculturalism’.13	  Yet,	  these	  approaches	  remain	  Eurocentric	  in	  that	  they	  refuse	  to	  reconsider	   other	   theological	   resources	   and,	   in	   doing	   so,	   repeat	   a	   colonial	   gesture	  where	  the	  activity	  of	  theorising	  itself	  can	  only	  be	  confined	  to	  the	  west.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   postcolonial	   theory,	   Mandair	   argues,	   has	   suffered	   from	   a	  Saidian	  hangover,	  a	  directive	  transmitted	  via	  Marx,	  that	  the	  ‘the	  criticism	  of	  religion	  is	   the	  premise	  of	  all	   criticism’.14	  Mandair	   references	  Edward	  Said’s	  The	  World,	  The	  
Text,	   The	   Critic	   which	   emphasised	   the	   need	   for	   secular	   criticism	   to	   counter	   the	  Orientalist	   construction	   of	   the	  non-­‐West	   through	   ahistorical	   religious	   categories.15	  Following	   this	   directive,	   Mandair	   argues	   that	   ‘most	   postcolonial	   theorists	   have	  treated	   the	  activity	  of	   thinking	  about	   religion	   as	   an	  oxymoron,	   thus	   forgetting	   that	  the	   activity	   of	   thinking	   (theory)	   and	   the	   work	   of	   religion-­‐making	   have	   been	  inextricably	  connected	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  thought	  and,	  of	  course,	  the	  colonial	  project’.16	   It	   is	   this	   refusal	   to	   take	   what	   is	   described	   as	   religion	   seriously	   that	  postcolonial	   theory	   consigns	   ‘its	   own	   emancipatory	   project’	   to	   ‘a	   kind	   of	  evolutionary	   historicism—the	   idea	   that	   whatever	   developed	   first	   in	   European	  modernity	   would	   inevitably	   follow	   later	   in	   the	   modernizing	   of	   the	   non-­‐Western	  world’.17	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  this	  evolutionary	  historicism	  that	  Mandair	  refers	  to,	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  Indian	  context	  to	  examine	  debates	  about	  the	  (post)	  secular.	  	  
—THE INDIAN (POST) SECULAR  A	   brief	   glance	   at	   the	   connotations	   of	   Indian	   secularism	   suggests	   that	   something	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  Western	  meaning	  of	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state	  emerges,	  even	   though	   such	   a	   separation,	   as	   Derrida	   has	   noted	   above,	   is	   impossible.	   Priya	  Kumar	  suggests	  that	  the	  complexity	  and	  slippages	  of	  the	  meanings	  of	  the	  secular	  in	  the	  Indian	  context	  are	  ‘in	  excess	  of	  the	  western	  notion	  of	  separation	  of	  religious	  and	  political	   spheres’.18	   Secularism	  has	  meant	  neutrality	  or	   impartiality	  with	   regard	   to	  religion,	  but	  it	  has	  also	  been	  associated	  with	  ‘tolerance	  of	  all	  religions’	  and	  has	  been	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‘made	   to	   serve	   the	   agenda	   of	   minority	   rights—to	   provide	   special	   treatment	   to	  marginalized	   religious	   groups’.19	   Paradoxically,	   ‘the	   notion	   of	   tolerance,	   in	   its	  hegemonic	   versions,	   is	   articulated	   in	   the	   liberal	   and	   paternalistic	   idiom	   of	   the	  “protection	   of	   minorities”—both	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   state	   policy	   and	   as	   an	   ideal	   of	  peaceful	   coexistence	   in	   society’.20	   This	   notion	   of	   tolerance	   was	   also	   claimed	   by	  Gandhi	  for	  the	  broader	  traditions	  of	  Hinduism.	  Thus,	  secularism	  in	  this	  meaning	  has	  underwritten	   the	  ambiguities	  within	   Indian	  secularism	  and	   indicates	   its	  difference	  from	   the	   secular	   in	  Western	   contexts.	   These	   meanings	   of	   Indian	   secularism	   have	  been	  examined	  and	  debated	  through	  various	  theoretical	  and	  political	  positions	  since	  the	  1990s,	  particularly	  since	  the	  rise	  of	  Hindu	  nationalist	  politics.21	  	  Contesting	   the	   value	   and	   utility	   of	   secularism	   to	   counter	   Hindu	   nationalism,	  communitarians	  like	  T.N.	  Madan	  and	  Ashis	  Nandy	  have	  critiqued	  Indian	  secularism	  as	   an	   elite	   Westernising	   project.22	   For	   these	   theorists,	   secularism	   as	   an	   ideology	  which	   seeks	   to	   keep	   religion	   apart	   from	   public	   and	   everyday	   life	   is	   alien	   to	   the	  Indian	  context	  and	  hence	  cannot	  be	  used	  as	  a	  resource	  in	  everyday	  life.	  A	  left	  liberal	  position	   is	   articulated	   by	   Rajeev	   Bhargava	   who	   has	   defended	   the	   tenets	   of	  secularism,	   especially	   its	   goal	   to	  protect	  minority	   rights,	   and	   argues	   for	   a	  political	  secularism	   that	   can	   take	   on	   the	   role	   of	   regulating	   an	   ethical	   co-­‐existence.23	   Both	  positions,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  note,	  appear	   invested	   in	  countering	   the	   force	  of	  Hindu	  nationalism.	   Named	   as	   communitarians,	  Madan	   and	  Nandy	   have	   both	   argued	   that	  secularism	  as	  an	  elite	  project	  has	  exhausted	   its	  resources,	   that	   it	   is	   time	  to	   turn	  to	  Indian	   religious	   traditions	   to	   mobilise	   extant	   non-­‐modern	   forms	   of	   tolerance.	  Bhargava,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  argues	   for	  a	  rights-­‐based	  secularism	  against	  what	  he	  terms	   the	   ‘vulgar	   Gandhianism’	   of	   the	   communitarians.24	   This	   rights-­‐based	  secularism,	  Bhargava	  suggests,	  is	  the	  best	  option	  for	  a	  ‘politics	  of	  the	  common	  good’	  in	  a	  ‘heterogeneous	  society’	  like	  India.25	  Mandair	   argues	   that	   this	   crisis	   of	   secularism	   in	   the	   Indian	   context	   has	  witnessed	  the	  emergence	  of	  another	  position.	  This	  position	  is	  identified	  by	  Mandair	  as	   following	   Said’s	   imperative	  of	   ‘rethinking	   secularism	  as	   a	   safeguard	   against	   the	  injustices	  of	  democracy	  defined	  by	  a	  majoritarian	  community’.26	  Yet,	  Mandair’s	  main	  point	  of	  contention	  against	  this	  attempt	  to	  rethink	  secularism	  is	  that	  it	  continues	  the	  refusal	   to	   rethink	   the	   religious.27	   Citing	   Anuradha	   Dingwaney	   Needham	   and	  Rajeshwari	   Sundar	   Rajan’s	   collection	   of	   essays	   The	   Crisis	   of	   Secularism	   in	   India,	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Mandair	  shows	  how	  the	  editors	  inflect	  the	  question	  of	  religion	  through	  historicism:	  ‘religion,	  in	  these	  essays,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  broader	  discourse	  that	  constitutes	  them,	  is	  primarily	  addressed	  in	  terms	  of	  historical	  explanation	  or	  a	  sociology	  of	  religion’.28	  In	  doing	  this,	  the	  authors	  suggest	  (they	  cite	  Derrida’s	   ‘Faith	  and	  Knowledge’	  essay),	   ‘a	  commitment	   to	   Enlightenment	   values’	   which	   operates	   as	   a	   ‘limit’	   to	   ‘a	   critique	   of	  secularism’.29	  For	  Mandair,	  the	  ‘religious/secularism	  opposition	  by	  way	  of	  reference	  to	  Derrida	  is	  a	  serious	  misreading’,	  but	  beyond	  that,	  he	  argues,	  these	  theorists	  ‘fail	  to	  see	   that	   secularism	   is	   as	  much	   a	   colonial	   imposition	   as	   religion’.30	  While	  Mandair	  appears	   to	   concur	  with	   theorists	   like	   T.N.	  Madan	   and	  Ashis	  Nandy	   in	  making	   this	  statement,	   his	   point	   is	   slightly	   different.	   India’s	   entry	   into	   history	   and	  modernity	  ‘happened	   by	   way	   of	   a	   certain	   politics	   of	   religion-­‐making’	   and	   even	   as	   Indians	  ‘describe	   themselves	  as	   secular’,	   one	  needs	   to	  acknowledge	   that	   this	   category	  was	  enabled	  by	  entry	  ‘into	  the	  Christian-­‐European	  category	  of	  religion’.31	  In	  other	  words,	  Mandair’s	   argument	   about	   the	   making	   of	   Indian	   religions	   through	   European	  categories	  intervenes	  in	  Madan’s	  and	  Nandy’s	  arguments	  for	  a	  recovery	  of	  religious	  tolerance	  through	  attention	  to	  everyday	  forms	  of	  religious	  practices.	  Mandair	  makes	  a	   similar	   intervention	   with	   regard	   to	   theorists	   who	   argue	   for	   secularism	   by	  attempting	   to	   rethink	   it	   yet	   do	   not	   take	   into	   account	   secularism’s	   theological	  political	   formation.	   But	   there	   is	   another	   position	   that	  Mandair	   does	   not	   take	   into	  account—the	  conceptualisation	  of	  a	  secularism	  that	  does	  avow	  the	  religious.	  
—DETRANSCENDENTALISING THE (POST) SECULAR Mandair’s	   argument	   is	   compelling	   and,	   I	  would	   argue,	  must	   be	   taken	   seriously.	   In	  fact,	   Spivak’s	   ruminations	   on	   the	   religious	   and	   the	   secular	   in	   a	   post	   9/11	   context	  appear	   to	   lend	   support	   to	   Mandair’s	   argument,	   albeit	   in	   a	   slightly	   different	  manner.32	  Navigating	  a	  role	  for	  the	  humanities	  teacher	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  binary	  that	  emerged	  between	  support	  for	  the	  US	  war	  on	  terror	  and	  the	  political	  position	  against	  the	  bombing	  of	  Afghanistan	   in	  2001	   (dismissed	   as	   support	   for	   the	  Taliban	   and	   its	  awful	   record	   of	   gender	   politics	   by	   the	   US	   administration),	   Spivak	   argues	   for	   a	  reading	   of	   secularism	   that	   does	  not	   disavow	   the	   category	   of	   religion.33	  Reworking	  Kant’s	  discussion	  of	  reason	  and	  religion,	  for	  whom	  ‘the	  judeo-­‐christian	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  religion	   of	   reason,	   de-­‐transcendentalized	   into	   secularism’,	   Spivak	   argues	   that	   this	  de-­‐transcendentalisation	   is	   ‘also	   a	   description	   of	   capturing	   and	   controlling	   the	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possibility	   of	   the	   transcendental	   as	   that	   which	   is	   worshipped’.34	   Furthermore,	  Spivak	   rereads	   secularism	   in	   its	   Judeo-­‐Christian	   formulation	   and	   legitimation	   via	  Kant	  against	   its	  own	  reason	  or	  otherwise,	  as	   it	  were.	  She	  suggests	  that	  this	  project	  requires	   reason	   ‘to	  be	  our	   ally’;	   ‘there	   is	   no	   compromise	  on	   that	   one,	   it	   cannot	  be	  fetishised,	   as	   in	   the	   most	   common	   version	   of	   secularism,	   laundered	   judeo-­‐christianity’.35	   This	   common	   version,	   often	   expressed	   through	   the	   concept	   of	  tolerance,	   allows	   the	   West	   to	   ‘de-­‐transcendentalize	   all	   other	   religions’	   while	  disavowing	   the	   ‘religion-­‐culture	   language’	   that	   ‘governs	   your	   own	   idiom’.36	   This	  disavowal,	   Spivak	   suggests,	   leads	   to	   the	   liberal	   celebration	   of	   the	   separation	   of	  church	   and	   state	   and	   the	   distinctions	   between	   public	   and	   private.	   These	   liberal	  separations	  enable	  the	  avowal	  of	  the	  transcendental	  (faith	  and	  religious	  practice)	  as	  a	  private	  practice,	  but	  disavows	  the	  religio-­‐secular	  idiom	  which	  governs	  the	  practice	  of	   secular	   governmentality.	   But	   these	   distinctions	   of	   church	   and	   state,	   public	   and	  private,	  Spivak	  argues,	  ‘are	  too	  race-­‐	  and	  class-­‐specific	  and	  indeed	  gender	  specific	  to	  hold	   up	   a	   just	   world’.37	   If	   we	   take	   into	   account	   the	   specificities	   of	   historical	  inequities	  of	   class,	   race	  and	  gender	   (sexuality	   is	   very	  much	  a	  part	  of	   this	   list	   even	  though	  Spivak	  does	  not	  name	  it	  given	  its	  fraught	  relationship	  to	  discourses	  of	  both	  the	   religious	   and	   the	   secular),	   then	   liberal	   separations	   of	   church	   and	   state,	   public	  and	   private	   are	   not	   tenable.	   Thus	   an	   assertion	   of	   secularism	   that	   is	   based	   on	   the	  privatisation	  of	  religious	  practice	  does	  not	  address	  the	  historical	  inequities	  of	  race,	  class,	  gender	  or	  sexuality.	  	  This	   is	   where	   Spivak’s	   rereading	   of	   the	   Kantian	   imperative	   to	   de-­‐transcendentalise	   religion	   as	   reason	   becomes	   useful.	   Arguing	   for	   a	   de-­‐transcendentalisation	   of	   religion	   so	   that	   we	   can	   ‘acknowledge	   religio/culture	   as	  idiom	  rather	  than	  ground	  of	  belief’,	  Spivak	  suggests	  a	  critical	  secular	  practice.38	  This	  practice	   involves	   undoing	   the	   binary	   between	   the	   transcendental	   (faith)	   and	  immanence	   (everyday	   religious	   practice).	   The	   detranscendentalisation	   of	   faith	  transfigured	   into	   religio	   involves	   thinking	   through	   co-­‐existence.	   Spivak’s	   call	   to	  detranscendentalise	   is	   made	   in	   the	   name	   of	   revisiting	   the	   concept	   of	   tolerance	  ‘which	   flourishes	   best	   when	   religion	   is	   de-­‐transcendentalized	   into	   something	   like	  linguistic	  competence’.39	  So,	  Spivak	  calls	  for	  a	  detranscendentalisation	  of	  the	  religio-­‐secular,	  in	  order	  to	  think	  through	  an	  ethics	  of	  co-­‐existence	  that	  appears	  to	  constitute	  a	   critical	   secularism.	   In	   doing	   so,	   Spivak	   echoes	   Geraldine	   Finn’s	   call	   for	   de-­‐
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trancendentalisation	   within	   feminist	   religious	   studies.40	   In	   effect,	   Spivak	   also	  appears	   to	   be	   arguing	   for	   a	   state	   secularism	   which	   needs	   to	   be	   much	   more	  competent	   in	   ‘juridico-­‐legal’	   terms	   to	   fulfill	   its	   secularist	   credentials—but	   this	  competence	   can	   only	   be	   gained	   by	   learning	   the	   languages	   of	   the	   other.	   So,	   for	  example,	   ‘the	   task,	   Spivak	   suggests,	   ‘is	   to	   find	   something	   like	   the	  “secular/transcendental	   binary”	   in	   the	   contexts	   (languages)	   that	  we	  work	   in’	   (she	  refers	  to	  concepts	  within	  Islam	  and	  Hinduism	  here).41	  	  What	   I	   find	  compelling	  about	  Spivak’s	  rumination	   is	  precisely	  the	  attention	  to	  inequities	  of	  gender,	  class,	  race	  and	  sexuality	  fostered	  by	  a	  religio-­‐secular	  idiom;	  this	  foregrounding,	   we	   need	   to	   remember,	   also	   contains	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	  decolonisation	  of	  the	  order-­‐word	  religio.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Spivak’s	  project	  of	  university	  secularism,	   I	   would	   suggest,	   is	   a	   case	   of	   rethinking	   the	   secular	  where	   the	   secular	  does	  not	   refuse	   to	   rethink	   the	   religious.	  But	   a	  key	   issue	   that	   resonates	   in	   Spivak’s	  formulation	   of	   secularism	   has	   to	   do	   with	   thinking	   through	   co-­‐existence	   from	   the	  position	   of	   those	  who	   have	   been	   excluded	   and/or	  minoritised.	   It	   is	   precisely	   this	  position	  that	  Aamer	  Mufti	  articulates	  in	  his	  reading	  of	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  otherness	  of	  religious	  identity,	  indeed	  its	  minoritisation,	  to	  the	  project	  of	  liberal	  Enlightenment	  discourse.42	   Mufti	   argues	   that	   the	   ‘“beginnings”	   of	   the	   crisis	   of	   Indian	   secularism	  around	   the	   identity	   of	   the	  Muslims	  must	   lead	   to	   the	  history	  of	   the	   involvement	  of	  European	   liberalism	  with	   the	  question	  of	   the	   Jews’.43	  Mufti	  asserts	   that	   the	   ‘fate	  of	  the	  Jews	  of	  Europe	  carries	  implications	  not	  simply	  for	  Europe	  and	  its	  peoples	  but	  for	  the	  projects	  of	  modernity	  as	  a	  whole’.44	  In	   his	   book	  Enlightenment	   in	   the	   Colony:	   The	   Jewish	  Question	   and	   the	   Crisis	   of	  
Postcolonial	  Culture	  Mufti	  is	  less	  concerned	  with	  anti-­‐Semitic	  or	  anti-­‐Muslim	  themes	  than	  he	  is	  to	  illustrate	  how	  ‘liberal	  culture	  attempts,	  sincerely’,	  as	  it	  were,	  ‘to	  resolve	  the	   question	   of	   the	   Jews—or,	   in	   India,	   of	   the	   Muslims’.45	   For	   Mufti,	   this	   liberal	  concern	   is	   manifest	   in	   ‘how	   liberalism	   historically	   talked	   about	   the	   modes	   of	  apartness	   of	   the	   Jews	   and	   the	   history	   of	   their	   persecution	   in	   Western	   society’.46	  Furthermore,	   Mufti	   argues	   that	   a	   European	   problematic	   in	   relation	   to	   Jewish	  identity	   emerges	   at	   a	   time	   of	   the	   ‘normalization	   of	   European	   selfhood	   in	   terms	   of	  national	   identities	   in	   the	   nineteenth	   century	   to	   which	   Jewish	   identity	   poses	   a	  number	   of	   insurmountable	   difficulties’.47	   Citing	   Marx’s	   discussion	   of	   ‘The	   Jewish	  Question’,	   Mufti	   argues	   that	   the	   ‘paradox	   of	   Jewish	   particularity	   as	   the	   basis	   of	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Jewish	   cosmopolitanism’	   informs	   this	   problematic.48	   So,	   ‘“the	   Jew”	   of	   modern	  Western	  imagination	  is	  both	  the	  threat	  of	  particularism	  confronting	  the	  secularizing	  and	  universalizing	  state	  and	  the	  figure	  of	  universal	  exchange	  that	  serves	  as	  a	  marker	  for	   the	   uprootedness	   and	   abstraction	   of	   bourgeois	   culture’.49	   Faced	   with	   this	  paradox	   of	   particularity	   and	   cosmopolitanism	   (in	   an	   identity	   that	   unsettles	   the	  abstract	   notion	   of	   the	   citizen,	   that	   is	   raced	   and	   religious	   and	   exceeds	   national	  borders),	   the	   European	   nation-­‐state	   attempted	   to	   offer	   solutions	   to	   the	   Jewish	  problem,	   namely:	   ‘"uniform”	   citizenship,	   religious	   “tolerance”,	   secular	   “national”	  literature	  and	  culture’.50	  Yet,	  these	  solutions	  produce	  a	  minoritisation	  of	  otherness.	  It	  is	  this	  structure	  of	  minoritisation	  that	  is	  common	  to	  the	  forms	  of	  sovereignty	  that	  include	   European	   secular	   state	   sovereignty	   as	   well	   as	   a	   secular	   Indian	   state	  sovereignty	  even	  as	  historical	  differences	  illustrate	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  debate.	  In	  this	  sense,	  there	  is	  something	  machinic	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  as	  it	  attempts	   to	   resolve	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   otherness	   of	   religious	   identity	   within	   the	  political	   discourse	   of	   liberalism.	   Yet,	   the	   reterritorialisation	   of	   this	   minoritisation	  produces	  a	  distinct	  set	  of	  problems	  in	  the	  South	  Asian	  context.	  For	   Mufti,	   the	   majority/minority	   axis	   referenced	   by	   Indian	   secular	   criticism	  hinders	   its	   attempts	   to	   rethink	   the	   secular.	   So,	   Mufti	   argues,	   what	   theorists	   of	  nationalism	  in	  the	  Indian	  context	  have	  failed	  to	  recognise	  is	  that	  rather	  than	  ‘a	  great	  settling	  of	  peoples’	  the	  ‘distinguishing	  mark’	  of	  secular	  nationalism	  is	  that	  ‘it	  makes	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  eminently	  unsettled’.51	  So,	  one	  can	  say,	  the	  minoritisation	  of	  Muslims,	   Sikhs	   and	   Christians	   produces	   an	   unsettling	   effect	   for	   these	   religious	  identities.	   Thus,	   Mufti	   argues	   that	   the	   ‘crisis	   of	   secularism’	   in	   the	   Indian	   context	  must	   ‘be	  examined	   from	   the	  point	  of	   view,	  and	  at	   the	   site	  of	  minority	  existence’.52	  Mufti’s	   discussion	   of	   the	   structure	   of	   minoritisation	   is	   a	   critique	   of	   Partha	  Chatterjee’s	  discussion	  of	   secularism.53	  Drawing	  on	  a	  Foucauldian	  model	  of	  power	  and	  governmentality,	  Chatterjee	  has	  attempted	  to	  theorise	  the	  assertion	  of	  ‘minority	  group	   demands’	   for	   ‘cultural	   right’	   as	   something	   that	   is	   made	   ‘in	   the	   language	   of	  rights’.54	   But	   these	   demands	   test	   the	   ‘limit	   of	   liberal-­‐rationalist	   theory’	   because	   a	  ‘collective	   cultural	   right’	   is	   asserted	  which	  also	   is	   a	   ‘right	  not	   to	  offer	   a	   reason	   for	  being	   different’.55	   However,	   Chatterjee	   argues,	  minority	   demands	   are	  made	   in	   the	  language	   of	   rights	   precisely	   because,	   for	   minority	   groups,	   the	   demands	   are	   ‘a	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contestation	   on	   the	   ground	   of	   sovereignty	   that	   the	   right	   is	   asserted	   against	  
governmentality’.56	  For	  Chatterjee,	   the	   solution	   to	   the	   issue	  of	  minority	   rights,	   especially	  when	   it	  comes	  to	  women’s	  rights	  in	  the	  Indian	  context	  given	  the	  history	  of	  personal	  laws,	  is	  not	   secular	   state	   intervention.57	   Rather,	   Chatterjee	   visualises	   an	   advocate	   for	  minority	   rights	   who	   has	   to	   engage	   in	   a	   two-­‐fold	   struggle,	   ‘resist	   homogenization	  from	  the	  outside,	  and	  push	  for	  democratization	   inside’	  which	   ‘would	  be	  a	  strategic	  politics	  of	  toleration’.58	  Yet,	  as	  Mufti	  has	  pointed	  out,	  Chatterjee’s	  formulation	  of	  ‘the	  minority	  subject’s	  refusal	   to	  give	  reasons	   for	  his	  or	  her	  difference	   in	  no	  way	  alters	  the	   structure	  within	  which	   the	  minority	   is	   cast	   as	   the	   site	   of	   unreason’;	   ‘reason	   is	  subsumed	  entirely	  within	  the	  life	  of	  the	  state.	  It	  also	  leaves	  intact	  the	  externality	  of	  minority	   to	   the	  nation-­‐state.’59	   In	   subsequent	  essays,	  both	  Gyan	  Prakash	  and	  Gyan	  Pandey	  have	  also	  critiqued	  the	  persistence	  of	  the	  majority/minority	  formulation	  in	  Chatterjee’s	   revisions	   of	   his	   earlier	   essay	   on	   secularism.60	   Even	   though	   Chatterjee	  argues	   for	  a	   re-­‐examination	  of	   secularism	   from	  a	  minority	  position,	  Gyan	  Prakash,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  ‘secularism	  cannot	  simply	  reassert	  the	  case	  for	  “tolerance”,	  for	  that	  merely	  reaffirms	  the	  minoritization	  of	  Muslims’.61	  Gyan	  Pandey	  argues	  that	  since	   the	  rise	  of	  Hindu	  nationalism,	   ‘what	  we	  have	   in	   India	   today	   is	  an	   intolerance	  not	   so	   much	   of	   particular	   religious	   practices	   or	   beliefs	   as	   of	   the	   simple	   fact	   of	  existence	   of	   people	   belonging	   to	   other	   religious	   denominations’.62	   Thus,	   it	   is	   the	  question	  of	  religious	  identity	  rather	  than	  practice	  that	  he	  suggests	  attends	  the	  ‘new	  politics	  of	  violence	  that	  comes	  with	  this	  intolerance’.63	  For	  Pandey,	  the	  response	  to	  such	  a	  politics	  of	  violence	  is	  to	  question	  the	  majority/minority	  axis	  and	  to	  ‘celebrate	  a	   new	   society	   of	  multiple	  minorities’.64	   Such	   a	   formulation	   requires	   unyoking	   the	  ‘state'	  and	   'nation'	   so	   that	   ‘the	  state	  does	  not	  cover	  up	   its	  own	  particular	   interests	  (and	   the	   interests	  of	   the	   ruling	   classes	   and	   factions)	   as	   the	   interests	  of	   the	   sacred	  community	  called	  the	  nation’.65	  	  Yet	  Priya	  Kumar	  has	  suggested	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  envision	  ‘how	  such	  delinking	  of	  (majoritarian)	   nationalism	   from	   the	   state	   is	   to	   be	   achieved	   in	   political	   terms’.66	  Kumar	  argues	  that	   ‘the	  very	  notion	  of	  Hindutva	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  coerced	  cultural	  assimilation’,	  so	  the	  counter-­‐argument	  of	  secularist	  debates	  which	  focus	  on	  the	   protection	   of	   minority	   rights	   is	   inadequate	   if	   the	   state	   itself	   produces	  minoritisation.67	   ‘Understanding	   religiocultural	   “differences”	   not	   as	   essentialized	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preexisting	  identities,	  but	  as	  forms	  of	  exclusions	  engendered	  by	  nationalism	  and	  the	  modern	   state’,	   Kumar	   states,	   ‘will	   enable	   us	   to	   move	   past	   the	   multiculturalist	  paradigm	  of	   a	   “politics	   of	   difference”—to	   think	   instead	   in	   terms	   of	   power	   sharing	  and	   equality	   within	   the	   form	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state’.68	   For	   Kumar,	   the	   answer	   is	   a	  ‘redistribution	   of	   power	   and	   political	   participation’.69	   The	   redistribution	   of	   power	  would,	  in	  a	  sense,	  redress	  some	  of	  the	  production	  of	  minoritisation;	  however,	  claims	  for	  rights	  still	  need	  to	  be	  made	  through	  a	  minority	  identity.	  So,	  she	  states,	  ‘the	  aporia	  of	   a	   minority	   rights	   discourse	   remains—mobilizing	   notions	   of	   a	   distinct,	   often	  bounded,	   cultural	   identity	   in	   order	   to	   stake	   its	   claims,	   this	   discourse	   risks	   fixing	  identities,	  besides	  denying	  ambiguities	  within	  the	  group’.70	  	  For	  Nivedita	  Menon,	  the	  issue	  of	   identity	   is	  paramount	   in	  thinking	  through	  an	  anti-­‐Hindutva	  politics.	  But	  a	  radical	  politics,	  she	  suggests,	  must	  confront	  the	  populist	  arguments	   that	   Hindutva	   leaders	   make	   in	   relation	   to	   identities	   which	   are	  minoritised	   rather	   than	   a	   rethinking	   of	   the	   secular	   only	   in	   academic	   terms	   as	  arguments	  made	  to	  state	   institutions.	   If	  Hindutva	   leaders	  such	  as	  L.K.	  Advani	  whip	  up	  a	  fear	  of	  conversions	  that	  will	  reduce	  Hindus	  to	  a	  minority	  status,	  Menon	  argues	  that	   the	   tactic	   is	  not	   to	   ‘deflect	   the	   fear’	  but	   to	   ‘confront	   it’.71	  So,	   she	  suggests,	   ‘we	  need	   to	   ask	   another,	   more	   aggressive	   question	   of	   our	   own	   instead—so	   what	   if	  Hindus	  become	  a	  minority	  one	  hundred	  years	   from	  now’,	   ‘our	  argument	  should	  be	  about	  ensuring	  democratic	  institutions	  such	  that	  it	  will	  make	  no	  difference	  to	  your	  status	  no	  matter	  the	  size	  of	  your	  community	  of	  birth’.72	  For	  Menon,	  the	  question	  of	  conversions	   for	   Hindutva	   organisations	   is	   not	   about	   religion,	   but	   about	   the	  majority/minority	   preoccupation.	   If	   this	   is	   so,	   she	   suggests,	   we	   need	   to	   ask	   why	  ‘religious	   conversion’	   is	   seen	   as	   ‘essentially	   different,	   in	   a	   democracy,	   from	   other	  kinds	   of	   conversion’	   such	   as	   when	   ‘political	   parties	   attempt	   to	   convert	   voters	   by	  wild	  promises’	  or	  ‘when	  political	  ideologies’	  of	  ‘Marxists,	  of	  feminists	  or	  of	  the	  Hindu	  right—attempt	  to	  convert	  with	  promises	  of	  redemption	  and	  threats	  of	  various	  kinds,	  both	  material	  and	  spiritual’.73	  So	  for	  Menon,	  the	  majority/minority	  axis	  common	  to	  both	   religious	   and	   secular	   state	   nationalism	   can,	   through	   a	   radical	   politics,	   be	  questioned	   and	   confronted.	   Such	   a	   move	   would	   destabilise	   the	   categories	   of	  majority	  and	  minority.	  Both	  Kumar	  and	  Menon	  suggest	  that	  the	  project	  of	  rethinking	  secularism	  must	  take	  into	  account	  a	  concept	  of	  living	  with	  otherness	  or	  other	  identities	  though	  their	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arguments	  take	  different	  directions.	  Kumar	  suggests	  that	  ‘state	  secularism	  can	  only	  work	   to	   restrain	   or	   contain	   religious	   violence’.74	   So,	   ‘the	   task	   before	   us’,	   Kumar	  suggests,	  ‘is	  not	  just	  how	  we	  can	  live	  together	  with	  some	  degree	  of	  civility,	  but	  how	  can	   we	   live	   together	   well’.75	   Living	   together	   well,	   Kumar	   argues	   (drawing	   on	   the	  Derridean	   notion	   of	   living	   well	   together),	   requires	   taking	   the	   question	   of	   co-­‐existence	  ‘outside	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  state	  where	  it	  is	  most	  debated’.76	  For	  Kumar,	  the	  secular	  in	  the	  Indian	  context	  has	  been	  burdened	  with	  too	  much	  of	  an	  expectation	  to	  provide	   solutions	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   coexistence.	   So,	   she	   suggests,	   ‘secularism	   cannot	  take	   on	   the	   burden	   of	   ethical	  ways	   of	   relating	   to	   otherness	   even	   if	   it	   has	   become	  imbricated	   with	   the	   language	   of	   tolerance	   among	   Indian	   elites’.77	   In	   this	   sense,	  Kumar	   refers	   to	   Nandy’s	   proposal	   that	   tolerance	   must	   be	   reactivated	   within	   the	  ‘conceptual	   domain	   of	   the	   religious’	   even	   though	   she	   disagrees	  with	  Nandy	   in	   his	  rejection	   of	   ‘Enlightenment	   secularism	   altogether’.78	   For	   Kumar,	   therefore,	   the	  concept	  of	   secularism	   is	  an	   important	  element	  of	   the	   coexistence,	   yet	   it	   is	  not	   ‘the	  only	  mantra	  for	  envisioning	  a	  violence-­‐free	  society’.79	  Tolerance,	  however,	  cannot	  be	  dissociated	  from	  power	  and	  governmentality,	  as	  Wendy	  Brown	  has	  pointed	  out.80	  In	  this	   regard,	   the	   recourse	   to	  Nandy’s	   recovery	   of	   religious	   tolerance	   appears	   to	   be	  lodged	  within	  a	  majoritarian	  politics.	  Menon,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   does	   not	   take	   the	   route	   of	   discussing	   living	   well	  together;	   rather,	   she	   focuses	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   secularism	   and	  communalism.	   She	   suggests	   that	   ‘living	   with	   secularism’	   in	   the	   current	   political	  climate	   is	   ‘something	   that	   is	   ongoing,	   rather	   than	   something	   which	   has	   been	  achieved’,	   something	   that	   ‘will	   always	  be,	   in	   the	  process	  of	   becoming’.81	  What	   this	  means,	   Menon	   argues,	   is	   that	   ‘to	   live	   with	   “secularism”	   is	   to	   live	   with	  “communalism”’;	   in	   other	   words,	   ‘to	   live	   with	   secularism	   is	   to	   recognise	   its	  implication	  in	  statist	  and	  authoritarian	  discourses	  and	  to	  unhinge	  it,	  twist	  and	  turn	  it,	  to	  rework	  it	  into	  our	  everyday	  practices’.82	  For	  Menon,	  the	  issue	  of	  recognising	  the	  implications	  of	  secularism	  and	  communalism	  goes	  beyond	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  nation.	  ‘To	  live	  with	  secularism’,	  she	  suggests,	   ‘is	  to	  question	  the	  fixity	  of	  national	  borders,	  to	   recall	   the	  past	   and	  present	   implication	  of	  what	   is	   today	   called	   India	  with	  other	  parts	  of	  Asia’.83	  ‘What	  would	  it	  mean	  for	  secularism’,	  she	  asks,	  ‘to	  teach	  and	  learn	  the	  history	  of	  South	  Asia	  rather	   than	  of	   India,	  Pakistan,	  Sri	  Lanka,	  Bangladesh?	  To	   live	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with	   secularism	   is	   to	   imagine	   the	   ghosts	   of	   centuries	   past	   and	   future	   silently	  breaching	  the	  borders	  of	  our	  nation-­‐states.’84	  	  In	   widening	   the	   lens	   within	   the	   debates	   on	   secularism,	   Menon	   touches	   on	  something	   crucial	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   nation-­‐state	   sovereignty	   in	   South	   Asia.	   The	  focus	  on	   religious	   identity	  and	   the	   structure	  of	  minoritisation	  has	  been	   integral	   to	  the	   history	   of	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   nation-­‐states	   of	   Pakistan,	   India,	   Sri	   Lanka	   and	  Bangladesh,	  each	  of	  which	  have	  negotiated	  with	  colonial	  sovereignty	  as	  well	  as	  the	  politics	   of	   communalisation	   and	   linguistic	   identities	   in	   their	   formation.	   Thus	   for	  Menon	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  avow	  or	  disclose	  hegemonic	  identities	  in	  the	  Indian	  context	  precisely	  because	  of	  their	  historical	  formation;	  as	  she	  states,	  this	  is	  ‘inescapable’	  as	  it	  is	   ‘intrinsically	   part	   of	   being	   an	   Indian	   citizen,	   and	   it	   is	   worth	   repeating	   that	   our	  religious	   community	   identity	   is	   also	   a	   regional,	   caste	   and	   linguistic	   one’.85	   Yet,	   the	  assertion	  of	  identity	  can	  be	  put	  to	  other	  uses	  by	  secularists—other,	  that	  is,	  than	  the	  expectation	   of	   an	   essentialised	   majoritarian	   or	   minoritarian	   identity.	   ‘Such	   an	  assertion	  would	  say’,	  she	  suggests,	  ‘I	  reject	  the	  politics	  of	  Hindutva	  as	  a	  Hindu	  and	  a	  nonbeliever,	   it	   does	   not	   speak	   for	   me’	   or	   ‘I	   reject	   the	   politics	   of	   Islamic	  fundamentalism	  as	  a	  Muslim	  and	  a	  secularist.’86	  Such	  assertions,	  Menon	  argues,	  ‘can	  add	  a	  powerful	  new	  dimension	  to	  the	  struggle	  against	  the	  politics	  of	  majoritarianism	  and	   religious	   fundamentalism’.87	   For	   Kumar	   and	   Menon,	   rethinking	   the	   secular	  involves	   challenging	   the	   majority/minority	   structure	   inaugurated	   by	   the	   colonial	  state,	   but	   also	   perpetuated	   by	   the	   postcolonial	   secular	   liberal	   Indian	   nation-­‐state.	  Kumar	  and	  Menon	  turn	  to	  the	  ethics	  of	  coexistence	  to	  challenge	  these	  structures	  of	  minoritisation.	   For	   Kumar,	   literature	   and	   film	   become	   sites	   where	   an	   ethics	   of	  coexistence	  can	  be	  renegotiated	  whereas	  Menon	  advocates	  a	  radical	  populist	  politics	  in	   a	   time	   of	   living	   with	   communalism.	   In	   a	   sense,	   both	   Kumar	   and	  Menon	   affirm	  Mufti’s	  as	  well	  as	  Spivak’s	  discussions	  of	  the	  secular	  even	  as	  these	  formulations	  take	  different	  routes.	  	  So	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   in	   advocating	   the	   concept	   of	   critical	   secularism?	   Mufti	  argues	   that	   ‘a	   critical	   secularism	   in	   South	   Asia	   today	   must	   confront	   the	  contradictions	   of	   its	   own	   genealogy’.88	   Legitimating	   Chatterjee’s	   analysis	   as	  ‘compelling	  and	  influential’,	  Mufti	  argues	  that	  it	  leaves	  Nehruvian	  secularism,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  its	  majoritarian/minoritarian	  formulation,	  untouched.89	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Gandhian	   communitarians	   champion	   a	   Gandhian	   ethics	   of	   co-­‐existence	   by	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referencing	   the	  non-­‐modern.	   This	   ‘anti-­‐secularist’	   position,	   however,	  Mufti	   argues,	  ‘is	  majoritarian	  in	  nature,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  places	  outside	  the	  bounds	  of	  critique	  and	   leaves	   intact	   normative	   notions	   of	   tradition	   and	   culture	   that	   have	   the	   nation-­‐state	   as	   the	   historical	   horizon	   of	   their	   emergence	   and	   codification’.90	   For	   Mufti,	  therefore,	   critical	   secularism	   involves	   a	   radicalisation	   of	   secular	   nationalisms	   (its	  majoritarian	   formulations	   in	   the	   statecraft	   of	   secular	   nationalism	   or	   through	   its	  Gandhian	   politics)	   from	   the	   site	   of	   minority	   existence.	   Such	   a	   critique	   would	  inevitably	   destabilise	   the	   normative	   assumptions	   of	   majority/minority,	   Hindu	   or	  Muslim	  which	  could	  ‘renounce	  the	  certainties	  of	  “home”,’	  Mufti	  argues,	   ‘if	  we	  resist	  the	  apotheosis	  of	   the	  nation-­‐state	  as	   the	  only	  proper	  dwelling	  place	  of	  culture	  and	  self’.91	  In	  other	  words,	  Mufti	  traces	  the	  need	  to	  challenge	  the	  normative	  assumptions	  of	  nation-­‐state	  sovereignty	  in	  order	  to	  think	  through	  an	  ethics	  of	  coexistence.	  Mufti’s	   project	   of	   highlighting	   this	   ethics	   is	   a	   detranscendentalising	   one	   in	  Spivak’s	   sense	   of	   the	   term.	  Mufti’s	   tracing	   of	   the	   search	   for	  Muslim	   tradition	   and	  writings	  on	  the	  political	  and	  the	  secular	  by	  Muslim	  writers	  (he	  analyses	  the	  writings	  of	  Askari,	  Maulana	  Azad,	  Sadaat	  Hasan	  Manto	  and	  Faiz	  Ahmed	  Faiz	  among	  others)	  detranscendentalises	   the	   religio-­‐cultural	   idiom	   of	   Islam	   for	   the	   project	   of	   critical	  secularism.	   Situating	   Maulana	   Azad’s	   writings	   within	   the	   religio-­‐cultural	   idiom	   of	  Sufism,	   for	   example,	   Mufti	   sees	   a	   difference	   from	   the	   Nehruvian	   formulation	   of	  Muslims	  as	  a	  minority	  within	  the	  Indian	  nation.	  For	  Azad,	  minoritisation	  cannot	  be	  reduced	   to	   the	   technicality	  of	  numerics,	   rather	   it	   is	   a	  question	  of	   a	  power	   relation	  that	  is	  established	  between	  the	  groups	  constructed	  as	  majority	  and	  minority.	  Mufti	  argues	  that	  Azad	  resists	  the	  technical	  formulation,	  conceptualising	  instead	  an	  ethics	  of	   coexistence	   through	   the	  possibility	  of	   ‘genuinely	  sharing	  a	   social	   space	  with	   the	  other’.92	   Thus	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   relation	   of	   power	   involved	   in	   the	   process	   of	  minoritisation	   as	   well	   as	   the	   conceptualisation	   of	   coexistence	   affirms	   Mufti’s	  commitment	  to	  a	  detranscendentalisation	  of	  a	  religio-­‐cultural	   idiom	  for	  the	  project	  of	  a	  critical	  secularism.	   	  If	   the	  religio-­‐secular	  machine	  produces	  a	  minoritisation	  of	  those	  it	  deems	  religious	  others,	  then	  the	  project	  of	  critical	  secularism	  envisioned	  by	  Spivak,	  Kumar,	  Menon,	  and	  Mufti,	   in	  particular,	   takes	   two	   routes.	   It	   involves	  disclosing	   that	   the	   religio,	   as	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Mandair	  discusses	   it,	  has	  attempted	  to	  transcendentalise	  other	  forms	  of	  the	  sacred	  on	   the	   terms	   of	   colonial	   Christianity.	   This	   disclosure	   leads	   post-­‐secularists	   like	  Mandair	  to	  the	  project	  of	  rethinking	  the	  theological	  political	  in	  the	  Indian	  context	  as	  a	   productive	   form	   of	   decolonisation.	   Yet	   such	   projects	   have	   their	   limits.	   Thus,	   a	  detranscendentalising	   disclosure	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   religio-­‐secular	   constitutes	  liberal	  nation-­‐state	  sovereignty,	  a	  move	  which	  Spivak	  calls	  for,	   is	  necessary.	  It	  may	  lead	   us	   to	   identify	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   nation-­‐state	   religio-­‐secular	   sovereignty	  produces	  minoritised	  religious	  others.	  These	   forms	  of	  minoritisation	  may	  result	   in	  liberal	   tolerance	   and	   protection,	   but	   are	   simultaneously	   vulnerable	   to	   violence	  through	  majoritarian	  politics.	  Such	  a	  relationship	  thus	  thwarts	  the	  ethics	  of	  sharing	  space	   or	   living	  well	   together	   as	  Kumar	   via	  Derrida	   argues.	   In	   this	   sense,	   a	   critical	  secularism	   as	   formulated	   by	   the	   theorists	   above	   may	   not	   be	   just	   be	   a	   necessary	  project	  but	  a	  crucial	  one.	  	   —	  Goldie	   Osuri	   teaches	   at	   the	   Department	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